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Preface
Many population models just approximate or neglect the spatial structure of the pop-
ulation. The aim of this bachelor thesis is to study evolutionary dynamic graphs. Evolu-
tionary dynamic graph considers either quantitative and qualitative point of view of this
problem. Quantitative point of view regards the size of specic sections of the population.
Qualitative point of view uses a graph to describe the structure of population.
Chapter 1 introduces basic principles of static games from game theory. Furthermore,
it describes specic classes studied in this thesis. The last section introduces the evolu-
tionary dynamic graph theory. The evolutionary dynamic graph is a graph whose vertices
play static games with each other. This structure if formally dened in Chapter 1. The
aim of Chapter 2 is to search for specic evolutionary dynamic graph with a periodic
behaviour. The crucial property of the searched evolutionary dynamic graph is the num-
ber of its vertices with regard to its periodic behaviour. Some estimates were made in
this topic. The aim of this thesis to make these estimates more accurate. Chapter 3 has
a similar aim with Chapter 2. However, we made the requirements on the evolutionary
dynamic graph more strict.
I would like to express my gratitude to the supervisor if this thesis, RNDr. Petr
Stehlk, Ph.D. for the scientic guidance, patience and linguistic support. Many thanks
comes also to my mother and Mr. Kishan Thakrar for editing. Finally, I thank my family
and close friends of mine for the patience and a constant support.
Keywords: graph, dynamic graph, evolutionary dynamic graph, games on graphs,
static game, game theory
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Static game theory
1.1.1 General static game theory
A game can be either: an activity made to entertain, improve one's ability at a certain
skill, or it can be understood as a situation when players interact and make decisions. The
last concept of game can be easily used to describe usual board or sports games i.e. chess,
football. Furthermore, the last concept describes every situation of making decisions and
interacting. Thus, business meetings, interaction of animals in nature can be described
by this concept. A specic class of games is a static game. In a static game, decision of
each player (subject interacting and making decision) is made without knowledge of the
decision made by other players.
Denition 1. A static game is one in which a single decision is made by each player, and
each player has no knowledge of the decision made by the other players before making
their own decision. [4]
Each game can contain many decisions and it can be very dicult to monitor all
of them. For the sake of brevity, decisions of players can be summarized in strategies.
Strategies are rules for decision making. This concept simplies the analysis and descrip-
tion of a game. Such a complex and delicate interaction such as a business meeting can
be simplied, for example the interaction of two subjects where either of subjects can act
aggressively or passively. Each of the two subjects in the meeting chooses a strategy of
being aggressive or being passive.
Denition 2. Strategy is a rule for choosing an action at every point that a decision
might have to be made. A pure strategy is one in which there is no randomisation. The
set of all possible pure strategies is denoted by S. [5]
Remark 1. The set of all possible pure strategies S is called a strategy set.
The result of interaction of players' strategies can be measured by a utility. A utility
is a numerical interpretation of result. It includes all positive and negative factors of
the resulting situation for specic player. In this thesis we focus on static games of two
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players with nite strategy sets. Players are denoted A and B. The appropriate way of
description of such game is an utility matrix.
Remark 2. The utility of player A (or B) as a result of combining ith strategy of player
A and jth strategy of player B is denoted by uAi;j (or u
B
i;j). All possible utilities can easily
be described by utility matrix.
Example 1. Let us have a static game with two players A;B. Strategy set for player A
is SA = fsA1 ; sA2 ; : : : ; sAMg and for player B is SB = fsB1 ; sB2 ; : : : ; sBNg. The utility matrix of
such game is M N matrix whose entries are ordered pairs of utilities.
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(1.1)
In addition, a randomisation can be added to a decision process. Each player with
a nite strategy set can choose each strategy with certain probability. The vector of
probabilities of choosing particular strategies is called a mixed strategy.
Denition 3. A mixed strategy  species the probability p(s) with which each of the
pure strategies s 2 S is used. [6]
Remark 3. The set of all possible mixed strategies is denoted by .
Each reasonable player wants to choose strategy which maximises its utility. The
simplest method is to exclude dominated strategies.
Denition 4. A strategy for player A, A , is strictly dominated by 

A if
uA(

A; B) > uA(A; B); 8B 2 B: (1.2)
That is, whatever player B does, player A is always better o using A rather than A .
Similarly, a strategy for player B, B , is strictly dominated by 

B if
uB(A; 

B) > uB(A; B); 8A 2 A: (1.3)
[7]
However, there exist some static games which cannot be solved by elimination of
dominated strategies. Thus, it is convenient for either of players to choose such strategy
none of the players can increase his pay-o. Such combination of strategies is called Nash
equilibrium. A concept of Nash equilibrium is named after John Forbes Nash who proved
a theorem regarding the existence of Nash equilibrium in a game with nite structure [2].
Denition 5. A Nash equilibrium (for two player games) is a pair of strategies (A; 

B)
such that
uA(

A; 

B)  uA(A; B) 8A 2 A;
and
uB(

A; B)  uB(A; B) 8B 2 B:
In other words, given the strategy adopted by the other player, neither player could
do strictly better (i.e., increase their pay-o) by adopting another strategy. [8]
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1.1.2 Specic classes
The main purpose of this thesis is to study the problem of cooperation. To do so, we
restrict a set of static games to the following:
1. Game has two players (A;B).
2. Players have equivalent strategy set, S = fCooperation, Defectiong.
3. Utilities of both players are symmetric, i.e. uA
(sAi ;s
B
j )
= uB
(sAj ;s
B
i )
; 8sAi ; sAj 2 SA; sBi ; sBj 2
SB.
Utility matrix of such a game can be expressed:
C D
C (a; a) (b; c)
D (c; b) (d; d);
(1.4)
or, further, simplied:
C D
C a b
D c d:
(1.5)
To maintain an accurate relation to reality of cooperation problems, we make the
following assumptions citeEvol:
1. For the sake of brevity, we assume that no two parameters are equal.
2. It is always better if both players cooperate than if they both defect, i.e. a > d.
3. If only one cooperates, it is more advantageous to be the defector, i.e. c > b.
4. No matter what strategy a player chooses, it is always better for him if his opponent
cooperate, i.e. a > b and c > d.
5. Finally, we assume that a; c are positive, b; d can be non-positive.
These assumptions lead to 4 possible scenarios [1]:
Structure Abbr. Scenario Nash Equilibria
a > c > b > d FC Full Cooperation (C;C)
c > a > b > d HD Hawk & Dove (C;D); (D;C) and mixed equilibrium
a > c > d > b SH Stag Hunt (C;C); (D;D) and mixed equilibrium
c > a > d > b PD Prisoner's Dilemma (D;D)
Table 1.1: List of all admissible static games and their properties
The topics of this thesis and of the [1] are connected closely. For the sake of brevity,
the names and abbreviations of scenarios were adopted from [1].
Inequalities describing each of these scenarios contain 4 independent variables. There-
fore, inequalities can be captured as four-dimensional regions which are dicult to plot.
Without loss of generality, we x parameters to be a = 1; d = 0. Regions can now be
pictured as two-dimensional regions as in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Parameter regions given a = 1 and d = 0.
Full Cooperation
Full Cooperation is a scenario with one pure equilibrium (players play the equilibrium
strategy without randomisation). The equilibrium strategy can be simply found by elim-
inating dominated strategies. Given a > c > b > d (Table 1.1.2), defection is strictly
dominated by cooperation. Thus, the best choice for either of players is to cooperate.
Hawk & Dove
Hawk & Dove scenario has exactly 2 pure equilibria and one mixed equilibrium. This
scenario cannot be simply solved by elimination of dominated strategies. On the other
side, the combination of strategies (C;D) and (D;C) satisfy the conditions of Nash equi-
librium.
Let us suppose the player A plays a mixed strategy A = (p; 1  p), where p 2 [0; 1] and
the player B plays mixed strategy B = (q; 1   q), where q 2 [0; 1]. Thus, the utility of
player A can be expressed as:
uA = apq + bp(1  q) + c(1  p)q + d(1  p)(1  q): (1.6)
Since we want to nd an optimal value of p, we express terms containing the variable p
only:
uA = p (q(a  b  c+ d) + b  d) + C; where C 2 R: (1.7)
Now, if player B plays strategy B = (q; 1  q) with:
q =   b  d
a  b  c+ d; (1.8)
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player A has the same utility uA no matter, what strategy he plays. The same procedure
with utility uB of player B results in the value of variable p:
p =   b  d
a  b  c+ d: (1.9)
If either of players A;B cooperates with the probability p = q =   b d
a b c+d , the other
player cannot increase his utility by the change of his strategy. This combination of
strategies is Nash equilibrium. Finally, the properties of parameters of Hawk & Dove
scenario: c > a > b > d ensures: 0 < p = q < 1.
Stag Hunt
The method of nding the pure equilibria and one mixed equilibrium of Stag Hunt scenario
is similar to the searching of the equilibria of the Hawk & Dove scenario.
Prisoner's Dilemma
Prisoner's Dilemma scenario has exactly one pure equilibrium. Since c > a > d > b,
cooperation is strictly dominated by defection. Thus, combination of strategies (D;D) of
players A;B is an equilibrium point.
1.2 Evolutionary dynamic graph theory
This section focuses on introducing the evolutionary graph theory. The main idea is to
consider vertices of given graph as a players of static games. The games are played each
time t 2 N0. An edge linking two vertices means the vertices play a static game of two
players each round. Utilities of vertices are summed and their strategies are updated with
respect to the sums of utilities each round. In the rst part we dene basic structures
and we begin with a graph as a basic structure.
Denition 6. Graph is an pair G = (V;E) where V is a nite set and E   V
2
 [ V 2,
where 
V
2

= ffx; yg : x; y 2 V and x 6= yg (1.10)
is a set of all two-member sets (unordered pairs) of members of set V . Members of set
V are called vertices. Members of set E are called edges of graph G. Vertices x; y are
neighbours if fx; yg 2 E. [3]
Remark 4. The number of all vertices jV (G)j is denoted by n. The set of all neighbours
of ith vertex is denoted by N(i).
Next we dene a mapping assigning each vertex in graph a strategy and graph with
strategy mapping-a strategy graph. We dene a specic notation for the sake of time
distinction.
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Denition 7. Given a strategy set S, we dene a strategy mapping s : V (G)! S to be
a function assigning each vertex a strategy from S. A strategy graph G is a graph with a
strategy mapping.
Observation 1. Strategy mapping s dened in Denition 7 assigns only pure strategy
to each vertex.
Remark 5. Since we study strategies across time, we denote by si(t) the strategy of the
ith vertex at time t.
Utility strategy graph is a strategy graph which assigns utility to each of its vertices.
Utilities are dependent on the strategies assigned to vertices. This formal denition of
utility strategy graph is very wide, since utility of ith vertex can depend on the strategy of
all vertices. Furthermore, utility functions of utility strategy graph is dened specically.
Denition 8. Utility strategy graph U is a strategy graph with an utility functions
ui : S
n ! R; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
All previous denitions enable us to dene a dynamic graph. Dynamic graph is a
utility strategy graph whose vertices' strategies are updated each time t 2 N0 in pre-
dened time-dependent sets. Updates are governed by time-independent update rule.
Denition 9. Dynamic graph D is a utility strategy graph with
 time-dependent update sets  : N0 ! 2V (G), which assign to each time t 2 N0 a set
of all vertices (t) whose strategies are going to be updated at t,
 update rules i : n ! , which assign to the vertex i a new strategy at time t+ 1,
i.e. si(t+ 1) = i (s1(t); : : : ; sn(t)).
Remark 6. We assume that the update rules i are time-independent.
Denition 10. Dynamic graph D with (t) = V (G); t 2 N0 is called a dynamic graph
with synchronous updating.
Strategies of vertices in a dynamic graph are updated throughout time, thus, we can
dene a strategy trajectory and utility trajectory of dynamic graph. Strategy trajectory is
a sequence of vectors containing strategies assigned to each vertex of dynamic graph with
given initial condition. Initial condition is a strategy trajectory at time t = 0. Similarly,
utility trajectory is a sequence of vectors containing utilities of vertices of dynamic graph.
Denition 11. Given the initial condition s(0) = (s1(0); s2(0); : : : ; sn(0)), we call s(t) =
((s1(t); s2(t); : : : ; sn(t)) a strategy trajectory of the dynamic graph.
Similarly, u(t) = (u1(t); u2(t); : : : ; un(t)) is called a utility trajectory of the dynamic graph.
Remark 7. Given time t, the vector s = (s1(t); : : : ; sn(t)) is called a strategy vector at
time t.
7
Next we dene symbol argmax. Suppose we have an indexed set X. Symbol max
gives us the greatest value of all members of the set. It is not always useful to know the
greatest value of the set only. Sometimes we need to know the index of the member of
the set with the highest value. Symbol argmax gives us the index of the member of set
X with the greatest value. Note that argmax can result in the set of indices.
Denition 12. Suppose x is an arbitrary member of some set X. Let f(x) be some
function that is dened 8x 2 X. Then the symbol argmax is dened by the following
equivalence.
x 2 argmaxx2Xf(x)() f(x) = max
x2X
f(x): (1.11)
[9]
Finally, we can introduce evolutionary dynamic graph which is a dynamic graph with
two member strategy set S = f0; 1g. The utility of ith vertex depends only on strategies
of the ith vertex itself and its neighbours. Similarly, an update rule updating ith vertex
depends on utilities of the ith vertex itself and its neighbours. This denition accentuates
the importance of the graph structure of vertices. Although evolutionary dynamic graph
is a complex structure, short-term behaviour of each vertex depends only on strategies of
vertex itself and its neighbours.
Denition 13. We say that a dynamic graph E is evolutionary if
 S = f0; 1g,
 the utility of each vertex depends only on strategies of the vertex itself and its
neighbours,
 the update rule i has the following form
i = sk 2 sargmaxj2N(i)[iuj(s); (1.12)
where k is the only element of the argmax set if jargmaxj2N(i)[ij= 1, otherwise :
1. k is arbitrary element from argmaxj2N(i)[i if 8l 2 argmaxj2N(i)[i : sl 6= si,
2. k = i if 9l 2 argmaxj2N(i)[i : sl = si.
Remark 8. The update rule either chooses the only element of the argmax set or it
preserves the strategy of the updated vertex.
Remark 9. Strategy denoted 0 is called Defection a the one denoted 1 is called Cooper-
ation.
Remark 10. There are properties common to all evolutionary dynamic graphs: strategy
set, update rule. On the other side, there are many properties which dierentiate evolu-
tionary dynamic graphs. One of the most signicant is the structure of utility strategy
graph. By the structure we understand the number of vertices and their connection by
edges. For the sake of brevity, we say that evolutionary dynamic graph E has a graph GE.
Graph GE has exactly the same number of vertices and the same edges as evolutionary
dynamic graph. Or, we can say that graph GE is the graph of evolutionary dynamic graph
E.
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Now, we can make an observation which is quite natural. Still it simplies further
explanation of behaviour of evolutionary dynamic graphs. It is not necessary to examine
behaviour of every vertex of evolutionary dynamic graph at every time. Vertices with the
same strategy as their neighbouring vertex at time t cannot change its strategy at time t.
Update rule (1.12) can only choose vertex with the same strategy as the updated vertex
have.
Observation 2. If sj(t) = sl(t) for each l 2 N(j) for some time t 2 N0 then j(t) = sj(t).
Let us introduce aggregate utility function ui;agg(t) which comply with the properties
of update function  of evolutionary dynamic graph in Denition 13. The main idea of
aggregate utility function is to sum utilities of ith vertex in all static games played with
its neighbours.
Denition 14. Function ui;agg : S
n ! R satisfying (dropping the dependence of strategies
on t for the sake of brevity):
ui;agg(t) = a
X
j2N(i)
sisj+b
X
j2N(i)
si(1 sj)+c
X
j2N(i)
(1 si)sj+d
X
j2N(i)
(1 si)(1 sj) (1.13)
is called aggregate utility function.
Remark 11. To study cooperation problems on the graph, the parameters a; b; c; d are
identical with parameters from Table 1.1. They also share the same properties and thus,
they form 4 scenarios given in the same subsection.
Other possible choice of a utility function is the mean aggregate utility function.
Denition 15. Function ui;mean : S
n ! R satisfying:
ui;mean(t) =
ui;agg(t)
jN(i)j (1.14)
is called mean aggregate utility function.
Let us take a deeper look into properties of strategy trajectories and vectors of dynamic
graphs. Properties are dened for strategy trajectories and vectors of dynamic graphs only.
Since evolutionary dynamic graphs are a special case of dynamic graphs, the properties
can also be observed for evolutionary dynamic graphs. It is natural to look for a strategy
vector of a dynamic graph whose strategies remain the same after updating. This vector
is called a xed point. Furthermore, we can observe "stronger" xed point called limit
of a dynamic graph. If strategy trajectories of a dynamic graph are constant from some
time t > 0, this constant vector is called a limit of a dynamic graph.
Denition 16. We say that a strategy vector sf is a xed point of a dynamic graph D,
if the strategy trajectories are constant for the initial condition s(0) = sf .
Denition 17. We say that a xed point sf is a limit of a dynamic graph D with initial
condition s(0), if there exists t0 2 N0 , such that for all t > t0 we have s(t) = sf .
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In addition, we can observe a periodic behaviour of dynamic graphs. If strategy
vectors of a dynamic graph repeat periodically from some time t0 2 N, we say that
the dynamic graph converges to a limit cycle. Similarly to the xed point we dene a
"stronger" property. If initial condition of dynamic graph is in the cycle, we can say that
the dynamic graph generates a cycle.
Denition 18. We say that a dynamic graph D with initial condition s(0) converges to a
limit cycle of length T if there exists t0 2 N0 such that for all t > t0 we have s(t) = s(t+T ).
Denition 19. We say that a dynamic graph D with an initial condition s(0) generates
a cycle of length T if for all t  0 we have s(t) = s(t+ T ).
It is important to pay attention to notation. The number of vertices of a graph G is
denoted by type n, jV (G)j= n. The length of a cycle of a dynamic graph D is denoted by
type k. Since both types k and n are usually used as indices of sequences or series they
can be easily mistaken.
Here ends the part devoted to properties of general dynamic graphs. Next we dene
some terms concerning evolutionary dynamic graphs only. The main dierence between
dynamic graphs and evolutionary dynamic graphs is in the strategy set S of evolutionary
dynamic graphs, SE = f0; 1g and thus jSEj= 2. It is sometimes more simple to study
sets of strategy vectors of evolutionary dynamic graph rather than single ones. Thus, we
dene a set m which groups strategy vectors of evolutionary dynamic graph with the same
number of cooperators.
Denition 20. Let m 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng. By m we denote a set of all strategy vectors s 2 Sn
such that m =
Pn
i=1 si . We call m a strategy prole of the evolutionary dynamic graph
E.
Remark 12. Given evolutionary dynamic graph E with jV (G)j= n the set m contains
exactly one strategy vector for m 2 f0; ng. The set m for m = 0 will be denoted by o and
its only full defective strategy vector can be also denoted o. The same holds for m = n
and its full cooperative strategy vector n.
Observation 3. Strategy trajectories are constant for the initial conditions o or n, thus
strategy vectors o; n are xed points.
The main subject of this thesis is to examine a periodic behaviour of evolutionary
dynamic graphs. One of the topics examines the number of vertices of evolutionary
dynamic graphs generating a cycle of given length k. Thus, we dene sequences Cs(k)
and Ds(k). Note that subjects of our interest are evolutionary dynamic graphs with
synchronous updating.
Denition 21. The minimal number of the vertices of the evolutionary dynamic graph
E with synchronous updating which generates a cycle of the length at least k is denoted
by Cs(k).
Denition 22. The minimal number of the vertices of the evolutionary dynamic graph E
with synchronous updating which generates a cycle of the length at least k and there exist
times t1; t2 and strategy proles m1;m2 such that s(t1) 2 m1; s(t2) 2 m2 and m1 6= m2 is
denoted by Ds(k).
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Lemma 1.
Cs(k)  log2(k + 2) (1.15)
Proof. Suppose we have an evolutionary dynamic graph E with at least Cs(k) vertices
which converges to the limit cycle of length at least k. The number of all strategy vectors
of evolutionary dynamic graph E is at least jSCs(k)j= 2Cs(k). The uniqueness of the update
rule  implies every strategy vector in the cycle unique: jSCs(k)j n.
Observation 3 excludes vectors o; n from being in cycle. Thus, jSCs(k)j= 2Cs(k)  k + 2.
Furthermore, Cs(k)  log2(k + 2).
Lemma 2.
Cs(k)  Ds(k) (1.16)
Proof. Let us denote the set of all evolutionary dynamic graphs generating a cycle of
length at least k by A(ECs(k)). Similarly, let us denote the set of all evolutionary dynamic
graphs generating a cycle of the length at least k and there exist times t1; t2 and strategy
proles m1;m2 such that s(t1) 2 m1; s(t2) 2 m2 and m1 6= m2 by A(EDs(k)). There
exists a evolutionary dynamic graph Emin 2 EDs(k) such that jV (GEmin)j= Ds(k). Since
A(ECs(k))  A(EDs(k)), then Emin 2 A(ECs(k)) and thus Cs(k)  Ds(k) for each k 2 N.
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Chapter 2
Cycle of arbitrary length
This chapter looks into a problem of construction of an evolutionary dynamic graph
which generates a cycle of arbitrary length k. Furthermore, we look into properties of
such evolutionary dynamic graphs. Especially, the number of vertices of such evolutionary
dynamic graph dependent on the cycle length k. The rst section of this chapter shows the
example of evolutionary dynamic graph constructed by Epperlein, Siegmund and Stehlk
in [1]. This example also states the sequence which estimates the sequence Ds(k) from
above. The second section explains the construction of evolutionary dynamic graph which
generates a cycle of arbitrary length k. However, every strategy vector in the cycle belongs
to the same strategy prole. Thus, this example provides the upper restrictive sequence
to the sequence Cs(k). The main question of this chapter is following:
Question 1. Given k 2 N, can we nd an evolutionary dynamic graph which generates
a cycle of length k?
Remark 13. The form of the question is crucial here. Exchange of word "given" with
"arbitrary" in Question 1 means we want to create an evolutionary dynamic graph which
generates a cycle of arbitrary length k 2 N when k is not known at time of construction.
Thus, we keep this formulation of Question 1. For the sake of clarity, if we create an
evolutionary dynamic graph which generates a cycle of arbitrary length k, it always means
k is given at the time of construction of evolutionary dynamic graph.
2.1 Exponential dependence
The article [1] provided a manual for construction of the evolutionary dynamic graph
EA and its initial condition sEA(0) which generates a cycle of arbitrary length k. The
example of such evolutionary dynamic graph also stated the sequence estimating Ds(k)
from above.
Remark 14.
Ds(k)  2k+1 + 2: (2.1)
Remark 14 states an exponential restrictive function. Since exponential function grows
very quickly, the question arises: Can we estimate sequence Ds(k) by a sequence with a
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slower growth? We conjecture that there is a polynomial function which restricts Ds(k)
from above. Note that the sequence which bounds sequence Ds(k) from above automati-
cally bounds the sequence Cs(k) from above (Lemma 2). Contrarily, the upper restrictive
function of Cs(k) does not state anything about the restriction of Ds(k).
Conjecture 1. There exists a function Bu(k) for which Ds(k)  Bu(k) and Bu(k) 2
O(ka) for some a 2 R+.
2.2 Walking structure
This example of evolutionary dynamic graph and its initial vector was inspired by "walker"
introduced by M. A. Nowak, p. 159 [2]. "Walker" is a cluster of cooperators which can
"walk" through the spatial grid of defectors. This section explains construction of such
evolutionary dynamic graph, its initial condition and derives conditions on parameters
a; b; c; d under which this evolutionary dynamic graph generates a cycle. Finally, we prove
this evolutionary dynamic graph generates a cycle under given conditions. An example
of this evolutionary dynamic graph generating a cycle of length k = 8 is presented in
Appendix A.
1
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Figure 2.1: Graph GE1 of evolutionary dynamic graph E1 with jV (GE1)j= 2k vertices.
Example 2. Let us introduce an evolutionary dynamic graph E1 with
 3-regular graph GE1 with jV (GE1)j= 2k described in Construction 1 and captured
in Figure 2.1 with jV (GE1)j= 2k.
 the mean aggregate utility function (1.14).
 synchronous updating.
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 initial condition sE1(0) = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) (Figure 2.2).
1 3 5 7
2 4 6 8
2k−1
2k
Figure 2.2: Initial condition sE1(0) of evolutionary dynamic graph E1. Vertices with the
strategy of cooperation (0) are green and vertices with the strategy of defection (1) are
red.
First, we clearly specify the construction of the graph GE1 with 2k vertices:
Construction 1. Let us have the graph with 2k vertices. Each of vertices has exactly 3
neighbours. Edges containing ith vertex for each i 2 f1; : : : ; 2kg :
1. (i; i+ 1) if i is odd, (i; i  1) if i is even,
2. (i; (i+ 1)(mod 2k) + 1);
3. (i; (i+ 2k   1)(mod 2k)  1):
We have graph GE1 constructed as in Construction 1. We state initial condition
sE1(0) with 5 vertices being cooperators and other vertices being defectors, i.e. sE1(0) =
(1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0). If k  5 then we can compute following utilities (at time t = 0):
u1 =
2a+ b
3
u2 =
2a+ b
3
u3 = a
u4 =
2a+ b
3
u5 =
a+ 2b
3
u6 =
2c+ d
3
u7 =
c+ 2d
3
u2k 1 =
c+ 2d
3
u2k =
c+ 2d
3
ui = d; i = f8; 9; : : : ; 2k   2g
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We formally dene the cyclic behaviour of evolutionary dynamic graph E1. Further-
more, we use this description of behaviour to derive conditions on parameters a; b; c; d.
We want the cluster of cooperators to "slide" compactly through the graph i.e.
si(t) = s(i+1)(mod 2k)+1(t  1); t 2 N (2.2)
The rule (2.2) species the strategy of the neighbour of ith vertex with the highest
utility. Table 2.1 clearly shows the strategy of each vertex in time t = 1 and the inequality
needed. Keeping the properties of the parameters a; b; c; d in mind (Table 1.1) we can
Index New strategy Inequality
1 1 a > c+2d
3
2 1 2a+b
3
> c+2d
3
3 1 Every neighbour is cooperator
4 0 a < 2c+d
3
5 0 a < 2c+d
3
6 0 2a+b
3
< 2c+d
3
7 0 a+2b
3
< c+2d
3
8 0 Every neighbour is defector
2k   1 1 2a+b
3
> c+2d
3
2k 1 2a+b
3
> c+2d
3
Table 2.1: The table of indices of vertices of evolutionary dynamic graph E1, their new
strategies at time t = 1 and inequality needed
reduce the list of all inequalities to:
2a+ b
3
>
c+ 2d
3
(2.3)
2c+ d
3
> a (2.4)
c+ 2d
3
>
a+ 2b
3
: (2.5)
Observation 4. Since inequalities (2.3), (2.4), (2.5) are satised, the strategy vector
sE1(1) of evolutionary dynamic graph E1 at time t = 1 with initial condition sE1(0) is
sE1(1) = (1; 1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0; 1; 1)
Observation 4 denes the change of initial condition sE1(0) to strategy vector at time
t = 1, sE1(1). We can show that evolutionary dynamic graph E1 with initial condition
sE1(0) generates a cycle. Observation 4 can prove the existence of a cycle in evolutionary
dynamic graph E1 after some modications.
Lemma 3. The evolutionary dynamic graph E1 with graph GE1 given by Construction
1 where jV (GE1)j= 2k (Figure 2.1), synchronous updating, initial condition sE1(0) and
parameters a; b; c; d satisfying inequalities (2.3), (2.4), (2.5) generates a cycle of the length
k for k  5.
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Proof. The change of strategy vector from sE1(0) to sE1(1) is claried by Observation 4.
We shift the indices of vertices of graph GE1 following way:
i  ! (i+ 1)(mod 2k) + 1; i = f1; 2; : : : ; 2k   1; 2kg: (2.6)
Thus, we obtain evolutionary a new dynamic graph E11, with graph GE11 . The strategy
vector of the evolutionary dynamic graph E11 is s
1
E1
(1) = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0). Using
Observation 4 we can update the evolutionary dynamic graph E11 to the state at time
t = 2. Shift indices again and repeat the procedure.
After kth repetition we obtain the evolutionary dynamic graph En1 whose graph GEk1 has
exactly same labelling as graph GE1 . Strategy vectors are equal, i.e. sE1(0) = s
k
E1
(k) =
sE1(k).
Thus, the evolutionary dynamic graph E1 generates a cycle of length k.
Observation 5. The evolutionary dynamic graph E1 with jV (GE1)j= 2k vertices gener-
ates a cycle for n  5.
We proved that evolutionary dynamic graph E1 with graph GE1 generates a cycle
of length k. Furthermore, we want to prove that every graph constructed as described
in Construction 1 can be modied such that evolutionary dynamic graph with modied
graph generates a cycle of length k + 1. First, the modication of graph GE1 must be
dened.
Construction 2. Let us have graph GE1 with jV (GE1)j= 2k constructed as in Construc-
tion 1. Now modify vertices a and edges following way:
1. delete edges (2k; 2) and (2k   1; 2),
2. add vertices 2k + 1; 2k + 2,
3. add edges (2k   1; 2k + 1); (2k; 2k + 2); (2k + 1; 1) and (2k + 2; 2).
Lemma 4. If we modify a graph GE1 of evolutionary dynamic graph E1 described in
Lemma 3 the way described in Construction 2 the evolutionary dynamic graph E1 with
initial condition sE1(0) = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) (Figure 2.3) generates a cycle.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3 with two small modications:
1. shift rule (2.6) is changed to
i  ! (i+ 1)(mod 2k + 2) + 1; i = f1; 2; : : : ; 2k + 1; 2k + 2g: (2.7)
2. we obtain the original strategy vector after (k + 1)th repetition.
Thus, the evolutionary dynamic graph E01 generates a cycle of length k + 1.
Observation 6. Every strategy vector sE1 of an evolutionary dynamic graph E1 with
initial condition sE1(0) contains the same number of cooperators, i.e.
8t 2 N0 : sE1(t) 2 m; where m = 5: (2.8)
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1 3 5 7 9
2 4 6 8 10
2k−1
2k
Figure 2.3: Initial condition of modied evolutionary dynamic graph E01. Vertices with
the strategy of cooperation (0) are green and vertices with the strategy of defection (1)
are red.
Every strategy vector in the cycle of evolutionary dynamic graph E1 belongs to the
same strategy prole. Thus, this example can make restriction from above of Cs(k) only.
Corollary 1. The Example 2 provide that:
Cs(k)  2k; k  5: (2.9)
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Chapter 3
Cycle changing strategy prole
An evolutionary dynamic graph stated in example in this chapter shares many properties
with the evolutionary dynamic graph described in the article [1] (here denoted by EA).
The main idea of the functionality of this evolutionary dynamic graph is almost the same.
In this section we introduce construction of such evolutionary dynamic graph. For the sake
of brevity, we divide vertices of evolutionary dynamic graph into 4 sets. Furthermore, we
explain behaviour of every vertex (change of strategy or keeping its strategy) throughout
the time of evolutionary dynamic graph and thus, derive conditions on parameters a; b; c; d
needed. An example of this evolutionary dynamic graph generating a cycle of length k = 7
is presented in Appendix B.
3.1 Introduction of the graph
1 2 3 4 5 6 k+1 k+2
k+3
k+4
k+5 2k+2k+6 k+7
Figure 3.1: Graph GE2 of evolutionary dynamic graph E2 with jGE2 j= 2k + 2.
Example 3. Let us have an evolutionary dynamic graph E2 with:
1. graph GE2 depicted in Figure 3.1 (Construction 3).
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2. the mean aggregate utility function (1.14).
3. synchronous updating.
4. initial condition sE2(0) = (1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) (Figure 3.2).
1 2 3 4 5 6 k+1 k+2
k+3
k+4
k+5 2k+2k+6 k+7
Figure 3.2: Initial condition sE2(0) of evolutionary dynamic graph E2. Vertices with the
strategy of cooperation (0) are green and vertices with the strategy of defection (1) are
red.
Construction 3. Let us have a graph on 2k + 2 vertices with edges:
1. (i; i+ 1) for i 2 f1; : : : ; k + 1; k + 3g,
2. (k + 4; i) for i 2 f3; : : : ; k + 1g [ fk + 5; : : : ; 2k + 2g,
3. (2; k + 3).
Remark 15. For the sake of further computation, the number of neighbours of vertex
k + 4 is dk+4 = 1 + (k   1) + (k   2) = 2k   2.
3.2 Properties and existence of cycle
We have graph GE2 with jV (GE2)j= 2k + 2 constructed as in Construction 3 and initial
condition sE2(0) = f1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0g of evolutionary dynamic graph E2. Next, we want the
update function  to respect following rules:
si(0) = si(t); t 2 N; i 2 f1; 2; k + 2; k + 3; : : : ; 2k + 1; 2k + 2g (3.1)
si(t) =

1; t(mod k)  i  3; i 2 f3; 4; : : : ; k; k + 1g;
0; t(mod k) < i  3; i 2 f3; 4; : : : ; k; k + 1g: (3.2)
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In other words, vertices mentioned in (3.1) never change their strategy and vertices
mentioned in (3.2) repeatedly become cooperators one after another and then collectively
change to defection.
Remark 16. We study a periodic behaviour of evolutionary dynamic graph E2. Thus,
it can be easily seen that sE2(t) = sE2(t + k) for t 2 N0 and k given by the number of
vertices of graph GE2 : jV (GE2)j= 2k + 2 (Rules (3.1) and (3.2)). For the sake of brevity
we consider only values of time t in t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; k   1g.
Now, we divide vertices into 4 main sets (Table 3.1, Figure 3.3). This simplies further
explanation of behaviour of the evolutionary dynamic graph E2. The sets:
 vertices that do not change their strategy except of vertex k+4 and every their
neighbour has the same strategy (1),
 vertices that do not change their strategy except of vertex k+4 and some of their
neighbours have dierent strategy (2),
 vertices that do change their strategy (3),
 vertex k+4 (4).
Set Vertices
1 f1; k + 5; : : : ; 2k + 2g
2 f2; k + 2; k + 3g
3 f3; : : : ; k + 1g
4 fk + 4g
Table 3.1: Elements of sets 1;2;3;4
Following paragraphs explain the conditions on parameters a; b; c; d needed to strategy
vectors satisfy Rules (3.1), (3.2). Furthermore, we explain behaviour of every vertex of
evolutionary dynamic graph E2 for all values of time t 2 f0; : : : ; k   1g. For the sake of
brevity, we omit each vertex j 2 V (GE2) at time t such that sj(t) = sl2N(j)(t). Strategy
of these vertices cannot be changed at time t (Observation 2).
Vertices in 1 : Neighbours of every vertex in this set have exactly same strategy as
the vertex itself. Thus, strategy of vertices in set 1 cannot be changed.
Vertices in 2 : Each of vertices 2 and k + 3 does not change strategy. Thus, for each
t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; k   1g the utilities are
u1(t) > uk+3(t) > u2(t): (3.3)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 k+1 k+2
k+3
k+4
k+5 2k+2k+6 k+7
Figure 3.3: Division of the vertices into sets from Table 3.1. Vertices from 1 are magenta
(purple), 2 are yellow, 3 are cyan (blue), 4 are black.
Sequences u1(t) and uk+3(t) are constant.
u1 = a
uk+3 =
c+ d
2
u2(t) =

a+2b
3
t = 0
2a+b
3
t 2 f1; : : : ; k   1g:
Inequalities (3.3) are satised for each t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; k   1g if:
a >
c+ d
2
(3.4)
2a+ b
3
<
c+ d
2
: (3.5)
The strategy of vertex k+2 can be changed in the time tc only if sk+2(tc 1) 6= sk+1(tc 1).
In other words, the strategy of vertex k+2 can be changed to cooperation only if strategy
of it's neighbour is cooperation. Still the utility of cooperator must be higher than the
utility of defector. This occurs if tc = k   1. Thus, uk+1(tc) < uk+2(tc). This leads to
inequality a+2b
3
< c which is directly implied by (3.5) and assumptions of static games in
Subsection 1.1.2.
Vertices in 3 : Vertices in set 3 are the ones described by rule (3.2). The cycle
consists of two stages: cooperation spreading (t 2 f0; : : : ; k 2g) and resetting (t = k 1).
Verbal explanation of behaviour of evolutionary graph may lead to confusion. Thus, we
stick to formal notation. Any time, please refer to Figure 3.2. It captures the strategies of
vertices at time t = i  2 for given vertex index i 2 f3; : : : ; kg. Further explanation uses
a specic property of an evolutionary dynamic graph with update rule  (1.12). First we
introduce new notation:
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i−2 i−1 i i+1 i+2
k+4
Figure 3.4: Strategies of ith vertex and its closely neighbouring vertices at time t = i  2.
Remark 17. Let us denote N0(i; t) the set of all neighbours of i
th vertex which have
strategy 0 at time t and vice versa N1(i; t) for strategy 1.
Now we make observation directly derived from the form of update rule  (1.12).
It describes the update of evolutionary dynamic graph with two vertices with dierent
strategy neighbouring under certain conditions on neighbours of either of them.
Observation 7. Let us have two vertices p and q of arbitrary evolutionary dynamic
graph with synchronous updating such that p; q are neighbours. Let their strategy be
sp(t) = 1 and sq(t) = 0 at arbitrary time t . Let N0(q; t) [ fpg = N(q). If up(t) >
maxj2N0(q;t)[N0(p;t)[q(uj(t)) then sp(t+ 1) = sq(t+ 1) = 1.
Cooperation spreading (t 2 f0; : : : ; k   2g): The proper course of cooperation
spreading is described by two elementary actions:
1. strategy of ith vertex from set 3 is changed at time t, where t = i 3 from defection
to cooperation, (3.2).
2. strategy of ith vertex from set 3 is not changed at time t, where t 2 fi 2; : : : ; k 2g,
(3.2).
Using Observation 7, the strategy of ith vertex from set 3 is changed at time t = i  3 if:
ui 1(t) > max
j2N0(i;t)[N0(i 1;t)[fig
uj(t); t = i  3; i 2 3: (3.6)
The notation of inequality (3.6) can be confusing. Thus, it can be simplied by
evaluating the right side:
max
j2N0(i;t)[N0(i 1;t)[fig
uj(t) = maxfuk+4(t); ui(t); ui+1(t)g; t = i  3; i 2 3: (3.7)
Next, the utilities of vertices in inequality (3.6) must be specically stated as the
functions of parameters a; b; c; d. The Rules (3.1), (3.2) directly implies vertex i from
i 2 3 to have one neighbouring cooperator and two neighbouring defectors at time
t = i  3. Thus:
ui 1(t) =
a+ 2b
3
; for t = i  3: (3.8)
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Similarly,
ui(t) =
c+ 2d
3
; t = i  3; i 2 3; (3.9)
ui+1(t) = d; t = i  3; i 2 3: (3.10)
The utility of vertex k + 4 is described by sequence uk+4(t) (using Remark 15):
uk+4(t) =
tc+ (k   2  t)d
2k   2 ; t 2 f0; : : : ; k   1g: (3.11)
Observation 8. Since c > d (Subsection 1.1.2), sequence uk+4(t) is increasing for
t 2 f0; : : : ; k   1g.
Now, we can evaluate inequality (3.6) using (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11):
a+ 2b
3
> max

tc+ (k   2  t)d
2k   2 ;
c+ 2d
3
; d

; t = i  3; i 2 3: (3.12)
Inequality (3.6) is true for all i 2 3. Thus, we have a system of j3j= k 2 inequalities
which can be simplied to one (t is substituted by i  3):
a+ 2b
3
> max
i23

max

(i  3)c+ (k   2  (i  3))d
2k   2 ;
c+ 2d
3
; d

: (3.13)
Using Observation 8 can be (3.13) evaluated:
a+ 2b
3
>
(k   2)c+ kd
2k   2 : (3.14)
Now, we claried the rst part of the cooperation spreading stage. Still we must show
the inequalities (3.4), (3.5) and (3.14) are sucient to prevent the vertices in 3 from
prematurely changing their strategy to defection. Particularly, the strategy of vertex
i 2 3 is not changed at time t 2 fi   2; : : : ; k   2g. The vertex i 2 3 has at time t 2
fi 2; : : : ; k 2g two neighbouring cooperators (vertices i 1; i+1) and one neighbouring
defector (vertex k+4). Thus, ui23(t) =
2a+b
3
, where t 2 fi 2; : : : ; k 2g. As mentioned
above, the only neighbouring defector of such vertex in 3 is vertex k + 4. Thus:
ui(t) > uk+4(t); t 2 fi  2; : : : ; k   2g; i 2 3: (3.15)
Since ui(t) is constant for the conditions mentioned in (3.15) we search for highest
possible value of uk+4(t) satisfying conditions. Therefore:
2a+ b
3
>
(k   2)c+ kd
2k   2 : (3.16)
Since 2a+b
3
> a+2b
3
(properties of a; b; c; d in Subsection 1.1.2), inequality (3.16) is
directly implied by (3.14).
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Resetting (t = k   1): According to Rule (3.2) si23(k   1) = 1 and si23(k) = 0
(the cyclic property of evolutionary dynamic graph E2 gives s(k) = s(0)). The only
defecting neighbour of all vertices in 3 at time t = k   1 is vertex k + 4. Therefore:
uk+4(k   1) > max
i23
ui(k   1): (3.17)
The cooperating vertices in 3 can have assigned just two values of utility: ui23nfk+1g =
2a+b
3
and uk+1 =
a+2b
3
. Thus (3.17) is equal to:
c+ d
2
>
2a+ b
3
; (3.18)
which is exactly the same as (3.5).
Vertices in 4 : Vertex k + 4 does not change its strategy: uk+4(t) = 0 for all t 2
f0; : : : ; k  1g. The cooperators with the highest utility in its neighbourhood are vertices
from 3. Particularly, vertices i 2 3 at time t 2 fi   2; : : : ; k   2g (this computation
is described in detail in the paragraph considering vertices in 3). The neighbouring
defector of vertex k + 4 with the highest utility is vertex k + 3 for all t 2 f0; : : : ; k   1g
(neither of neighbours of vertex k + 3 changes its strategy). Thus:
uk+3(t) > ui(t); t 2 fi  2; : : : ; k   2g; i 2 3: (3.19)
Furthermore, simplied to:
c+ d
2
>
2a+ b
3
: (3.20)
This complicated deduction results in three inequalities (3.4), (3.5), (3.14). These
inequalities were computed with the respect to stated Rules (3.1), (3.2). Now these
computations need to be summarized by lemma.
Lemma 5. Let us have evolutionary dynamic graph E2 with graph GE2 on jV (GE2)j=
2k + 2 vertices constructed as in Construction 3, mean aggregate utility function (1.14),
synchronous updating, initial condition sE2(0) = (1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) (Figure 3.1) and parame-
ters a; b; c; d satisfying inequalities (3.4), (3.5), (3.14). This evolutionary dynamic graph
E2 generates a cycle of length k.
Proof. Inequalities (3.4), (3.5), (3.14) were derived a and described in detail in this chap-
ter. Since inequalities are satised, strategy trajectory of each vertex of evolutionary
dynamic graph E2 satisfy rules (3.1) and (3.2). If strategy trajectories of evolutionary dy-
namic graph satisfy rules (3.1) and (3.2) and these rules describe a strategy trajectory for
which sE2(t) = sE2(t + k) for each t 2 N0 then evolutionary dynamic graph E2 generates
a cycle of length k.
We can construct graph GE2 as in Construction 3 for each k 2 N. Subsequently,
we can derive conditions (3.4), (3.5), (3.14) dependent on k. Thus, Lemma 5 provides
evolutionary dynamic graph E2 to generate a cycle of a given length k. We can construct
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evolutionary dynamic graph which generates a cycle of arbitrary length k. Furthermore,
the number of vertices of graph GE2 of evolutionary dynamic graph E2 is jV (GE2)j= 2k+2.
The graph size is linearly dependent on the cycle length. Thus, we found a sequence from
Conjecture 1 such that it belongs to the set O(k) and we can state a new bound of Ds(k).
Remark 18.
Ds(k)  2k + 2; k  3 (3.21)
3.3 Parameter region
Lemma 5 states inequalities (3.4), (3.5), (3.14) which are needed for the existence of the
cycle in evolutionary dynamic graph E2. These three inequalities describe a region of
admissible values of parameters a; b; c; d. This region is plotted in Figure 3.3 for xed
a = 1 and d = 0 and few chosen values of cycle length k.
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Figure 3.5: Region of admissible values of parameters a; b; c; d (red) of evolutionary dy-
namic graph E2 generating a cycle of length k. Plotted for k = 2; 5; 10; 20
It can be easily seen the area of parameter region reducing for increasing k. Further-
more, we can specify the character of reduction of the area of region. For very great k we
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can observe:
(k   2)c+ kd
2(k   1)
k!1   ! c+ d
2
: (3.22)
Thus, since (3.5), (3.14) gives 2a+b
3
< c+d
2
and a+2b
3
> (k 2)c+kd
2k 2 :
2a+ b
3
k!1   ! c+ d
2
; (3.23)
a+ 2b
3
k!1   ! 2a+ b
3
: (3.24)
Furthermore, simplied (3.24):
a
k!1   ! b (3.25)
Observation 9. Given a = 1 and d = 0:
b
k!1   ! 1 (3.26)
c
k!1   ! 2 (3.27)
It can be easily seen that the region of admissible values of parameters a; b; c; d collapses
into a single point for xed a = 1 and d = 0 and very great k. This is the motivation
for further study. Suppose there exists evolutionary dynamic graph E which generates a
cycle of arbitrary length k and its conditions on parameters a; b; c; d are not dependent
on k. Even for very great k, the region of admissible parameters does not collapse into
a single point. Assuming the polynomial dependence of the number of vertices on the
cycle length is natural. Evolutionary dynamic graph E1 satisfy conditions above. Thus,
we consider only evolutionary dynamic graph E with some initial condition sE(0) where
exist two strategy vectors sE(t1); sE(t2) such that sE(t1) 2 m1; sE(t2) 2 m2 and m1 6= m2.
Contemplations above lead us to next question:
Question 2. Can we construct an evolutionary dynamic graph E which generates a cycle
of length k for given value of k with following properties: The inequalities ensuring the
existence of a cycle in E are not dependent on k. The number of vertices of graph GE of
evolutionary dynamic graph GE is in the set: jV (GE)j2 O(k). There exist two strategy
vectors in the cycle sE(t1); sE(t2) such that sE(t1) 2 m1; sE(t2) 2 m2 and m1 6= m2.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
This thesis introduced the evolutionary dynamic graphs. The evolutionary dynamic
graphs can be described as graphs whose vertices connected with edges play static games
with each other. Furthermore, their pure strategy played in the static game is updated
in accordance with the success of the strategies of their neighbours. These structures are
very complex. Thus, their behaviour is unpredictable. In order to deepen the knowledge
of these structures we used simple deductions and examples to describe and investigate
their properties.
We study a periodic behaviour of the evolutionary dynamic graphs. Particularly, we
study the number of vertices of evolutionary dynamic graph with respect to the length
of the cycle they generate. We state two sets of evolutionary dynamic graphs generating
a cycle: all evolutionary dynamic graphs generating a cycle and evolutionary dynamic
graphs generating a cycle and changing the number of cooperating vertices. We estimate
the number of vertices of such evolutionary dynamic graphs generating a cycle of length
at least k which is denoted by: Cs(k) for the rst case and Ds(k) for the second case
(Denitions 21 and 22 on page 10). By examples in Section 2.2 and Chapter 3 and two
Lemmas 1 and 2 we stated following inequalities for k  5:
log2(k + 2)  Cs(k)  Ds(k)  2k + 2; (4.1)
Cs(k)  2k: (4.2)
The estimate of sequences Cs(k) and Ds(k) from above by a sequence with linear growth
can considered as the main success of this thesis.
Furthermore, we observed parameters describing static games played. Examples described
in this thesis use the same method: we state evolutionary dynamic graph which generates
a cycle of length k and subsequently derive conditions providing existence of the cycle.
This order of deductions inspires a question:
Question 3. Can we construct an evolutionary dynamic graph generating a cycle of given
length k for given scenario from Table 1.1?
Furthermore, we can ask question which is even more dicult do answer than the
previous one:
Question 4. Can we construct an evolutionary dynamic graph generating a cycle of given
length k for given parameters a; b; c; d?
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Questions stated in this chapter show, that the topic of evolutionary dynamic graphs
is very wide. Reader can ask more questions and investigate the evolutionary dynamic
graphs from many views. For example, we did consider only evolutionary dynamic graphs
with synchronous updating (all vertices are updated at once) or we used mean aggregate
utility function only (1.14). Let this paragraph and questions stated be the inspiration
for the further research.
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Note to bibliography
The ideas for denitions 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 from Section
1.2 were adopted from article [1]. Since article [1] was a concept, some expressions were
changed or improved for the sake of consistence.
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Appendix A
Example from Section 2.2
Following gures show example of a cycle generated by evolutionary dynamic graph E1
with:
 3-regular graph GE1 with jV (GE1)j= 16 described in Construction 1.
 initial condition sE1(0) = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) (Figure 2.2).
 paramters a; b; c; d satisfying conditions (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5).
 the mean aggregate utility function (1.14).
 synchronous updating.
Above described evolutionary dynamic graph generates a cycle of length k = 8. It
is obvious that strategy vectors at time t1 = 0 and t2 = 8 are equal.
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Appendix B
Example from Chapter 3
We captured an example of evolutionary dynamic graph E2 from Chapter 3 with:
 graph GE2 , where jV (GE2)j= 16,
 initial condition sE2(0) = f1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0g,
 parameters a; b; c; d satisfying conditions (3.4), (3.5), (3.14) for k = 7,
 the mean aggregate utility function (1.14).
 synchronous updating.
Following gures show the course of the cycle of length k = 7 generated by evolutionary
dynamic graph E2. Note that strategy vectors at times t1 = 0 and t2 = 7 are equivalent,
sE2(0) = sE2(7). Also note vertices changing their strategy in accordance with Rules (3.1),
(3.2) for k = 7.
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